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BASIC’S “BITTER HARVEST”: THE COURT’S 
CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO A FLAWED 
ECONOMIC THEORY IN HALLIBURTON 
Julia Kline∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Halliburton Co. v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc.1 permits defendants in federal securities fraud
class actions to rebut the presumption that an investor relied on a
security’s price with evidence showing no price impact2 at the
class-certification stage.3 Prior to this ruling, defendants had to wait
until trial to present evidence that an alleged misstatement did not
actually impact the security’s price.4 The ruling disappointed many
corporate advocates and legal scholars who had hoped the Court
would strike down what critics deem a controversial “judge-made
rule” that fuels frivolous and expensive shareholder litigation.5
A. A Legal Doctrine Based on Economic Theory
Legal scholars have long contested the reliance presumption’s 
validity as a legal doctrine.6 The Court first adopted the reliance 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I would like to extend my
most sincere thanks to Professor Michael Guttentag and Senior Note and Comment Editor Heidi 
Tong for their support during the drafting and editing phases. I would also like to thank the 
2015-16 Editorial Board for their effort and dedication. 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. Id. at 2414–15 (stating that evidence of no price impact is typically shown through event
studies, statistical analyses that seek to isolate the effect of an alleged misstatement on price). 
3. Id. at 2417.
4. Id. at 2402.
5. Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Leaves Fraud on Market Intact, Makes Life a Bit Harder
for Securities Plaintiffs, FORBES (June 23, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/danielfisher/2014/06/23/supreme-court-leaves-fraud-on-market-intact-but-makes-life-harder-for 
-securities-plaintiffs/; see also James Bohn & Steven Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market:
Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 905 (1996)
(“Opportunistic plaintiffs’ attorneys continuously monitor securities prices, probing for recent
securities offerings that perform poorly in the aftermarket.”).
6. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 251–56 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine, as interpreted by some lower courts, improperly equates 
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presumption twenty-five years ago in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,7 which 
held plaintiffs in securities fraud claims did not need to demonstrate 
direct reliance on a company’s alleged misstatement.8 Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) prohibit an issuer of a 
security from making any “material misstatement or omission” 
concerning a company or its securities.9 This provision is frequently 
enforced through private-shareholder class actions.10 To recover in a 
Rule 10b-5 action, a plaintiff must show “(1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance on the misrepresentation 
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”11 
In Basic, the Court ruled investors could show reliance by 
“invoking a presumption that [the stock price] reflects all public, 
material information—including material misstatements,” therefore 
enabling the inference an investor relied on such information when 
buying the stock at market price.12 This inference is based on the 
“fraud-on-the-market” doctrine, which asserts “the market price of 
shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly 
available information, and, hence, any material 
misrepresentations.”13 The Court also reasoned that “common sense 
and probability” indicated most investors rely on a security’s price 
when making decisions to buy or sell a stock.14 To invoke the 
reliance presumption, a plaintiff must show (1) the alleged 
misstatement was publicly known; (2) the alleged misstatement was 
material; (3) the market for the stock was “efficient”; and (4) the 
plaintiff traded the stock during the affected time period.15 
causation with reliance when many investors do not rely on a stock’s price when trading); see 
also Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Logic, economic realities, and our 
subsequent jurisprudence have undermined the foundations of the Basic presumption . . . .”). 
7. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
8. Id. at 247.
9. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407.
10. See id.
11. Id. (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192
(2013)). 
12. Id. at 2405.
13. Id. at 2408 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 246).
14. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246.
15. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2408.
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B. The Presumption’s Effect on Securities Fraud Actions
The reliance presumption effectively created the securities-fraud 
class action because it shifted the question of reliance from the 
individual to one common to the class.16 Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) requires class-action plaintiffs to show 
common questions of law or fact predominate over individual 
questions.17 Accordingly, the reliance presumption is a “powerful 
tool” for plaintiffs seeking class certification, because defendants are 
unlikely to agree to settle claims until the court certifies the class.18 
Thus, enforcing the individual reliance requirement would 
effectively prevent plaintiffs from joining a class action because 
individual questions would predominate over common ones.19 Critics 
of the reliance presumption argue the fraud on the market doctrine is 
based on an economic theory, which requires market efficiency to be 
properly applied in securities fraud class actions.20  
II. THE HALLIBURTON CASE
The Halliburton litigation arose from alleged misrepresentations 
by the Halliburton Company and its CEO (“Halliburton”) concerning 
substantive portions of its business operations.21 The plaintiffs, 
represented by the Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”), were 
shareholders who claimed to have suffered losses due to 
Halliburton’s “fraudulent misrepresentations” made between 1999 
and 2001.22 The Fund argued the following: “(1) [Halliburton] 
understated its projected liability for asbestos claims; (2) it 
overstated its revenues by including billings whose collections were 
unlikely; and (3) it exaggerated the cost savings and efficiencies [the 
company] would derive from its 1998 merger with Dresser 
16. See Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1209 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the class
certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)). 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
18. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 755 (3d Cir. 2010).
19. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407–08.
20. See id. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the reliance presumption as based on
“nascent economic theory and naked intuitions about investment behavior”); see also Desai v. 
Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the presumption did not 
apply in an “inefficient” market); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 
F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding a lower court misapplied the presumption).
21. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated,
134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
22. Halliburton, 718 F.3d at 426.
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Industries.”23 As a result, the Fund contended Halliburton’s 
misstatements prompted a temporary spike in its stock price, which 
subsequently fell after Halliburton disclosed the inaccuracies. 24 The 
Fund argued that the price drop had caused the Fund participants’ 
economic losses because those investors purchased shares during the 
relevant time frame.25 
In a prior ruling involving the same parties,26 the Court ruled the 
Fund did not need to demonstrate loss causation at the 
class-certification phase to invoke the reliance presumption.27 
Accordingly, the Court left the reliance presumption undisturbed.28 
In the prior ruling, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment for 
Halliburton, and remanded the case to lower courts to hear “any 
further arguments against class certification.”29 
During these class-certification arguments, Halliburton 
attempted to rebut the reliance presumption by re-introducing 
evidence showing the alleged misrepresentations had not impacted 
its stock’s market price.30 If the price had been unaffected by the 
alleged misstatements, then a presumption that the class had relied 
on the price when trading the stock would be improper. Without the 
reliance presumption, each plaintiff in the class would have to 
demonstrate direct reliance, which would mean common questions 
would no longer predominate, and the class would not meet the 
certification requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).31 The district court 
refused to certify the class because the Fund had not met the Fifth 
Circuit’s requirement to show loss causation.32 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, holding defendant Halliburton could not present evidence 
of no price impact until trial, and certified the class.33 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the presumption of 
reliance continued to be a valid legal doctrine, and if defendants in 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (noting loss
causation is distinct from the issue of whether an investor relied on the price of a stock when 
trading). 
27. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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securities fraud class actions could introduce price impact evidence 
to rebut the reliance presumption at the class-certification stage.34 
Although many corporate advocates hoped the Court would use 
Halliburton to strike down the reliance presumption and effectively 
halt meritless securities fraud claims, the Court left the presumption 
intact.35 The Court found no “special justification”36 for overruling 
the reliance presumption set in Basic.37 Reasoning that Basic already 
provided the reliance presumption could be rebutted by “price impact 
evidence,”38 the Court reiterated the fairness rationale that requiring 
proof of direct individual reliance would pose an “unrealistic 
evidentiary burden” on the plaintiff investor.39 The Court rejected 
Halliburton’s argument that modern capital markets are “not 
fundamentally efficient”40 and investors base trading decisions on a 
variety of factors, many of which have nothing to do with price.41 
The Court did not find any of the empirical studies42 sufficiently 
persuasive to upset Basic’s logic and suggested Congress could pass 
legislation if it determined the reliance presumption was 
inappropriate or had negative policy implications.43 Nevertheless, the 
Court agreed that defendants should be able to introduce direct 
evidence showing the alleged misrepresentation had not impacted the 
stock price at the class-certification stage.44 If defendants can 
successfully demonstrate there is no causal connection between the 
alleged misstatement and the investor’s loss, then reliance must be 
found on an individual basis and individual issues will 
predominate.45 Therefore, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling 
precluding Halliburton from presenting price impact evidence during 
34. Id. at 2405.
35. See Michael R. Smith et al., Halliburton Ruling: High Court Affirms Basic v. Levinson
and Confirms Defendants May Rebut Reliance Presumption at Class Certification by Showing 
Absence of Price Impact, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (July 2014), http://www.americanbar.org 
/publications/blt/2014/07/keeping_current_smith.html. 
36. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407.
37. Id. at 2417.
38. Id. at 2407 (citations omitted).
39. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)).
40. Id. at 2409 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id. at 2411 (citing the “value investor” who buys and sells based on a stock’s
predicted future value, not the current price). 
42. See id. at 2409 (referring to briefs filed by amici curiae citing evidence that stock prices
do not always accurately reflect public information). 
43. See id. at 2411.
44. Id. at 2414.
45. See id. at 2416.
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class-certification arguments, but it upheld the reliance 
presumption’s validity.46 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES RAISED BY THE RULING
Despite the unanimous ruling in Halliburton, the reliance 
presumption remains contested, even by the Court.47 The basis for 
this disagreement remains the large body of empirical evidence 
challenging the underpinnings of the fraud-on-the-market theory and 
its applicability to all modern financial markets.48 
As previously discussed, the fraud-on-the-market theory rests on 
two critical assumptions: that investors rely on publicly available 
information when making trading decisions and that financial 
markets are efficient.49 The Court noted that an investor could, under 
certain circumstances, invoke the reliance presumption based on the 
following two assumptions: (1) that an investor makes a decision to 
buy or sell stock in reliance on efficient pricing; and (2) that the price 
of a stock adjusts efficiently to all publicly available information.50 
The Court dismissed recent scholarship suggesting neither of these 
assumptions hold in today’s financial markets.51 Furthermore, the 
Court acknowledges that the reliance presumption, as described in 
Basic, is reasonable because “most investors” will rely on price when 
trading.52 
This Comment seeks to clarify the reliance presumption’s 
underlying assumptions and the fraud on the market theory and 
explain why failure of either assumption would seriously undermine 
the validity of the legal doctrine. Part IV will focus on the role of 
46. Id. at 2417.
47. See id. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (challenging the validity of the reliance
presumption and arguing “Basic should be overruled”). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in 
his concurring opinion. Id. 
48. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671, 671 (2014)
(arguing that “fraudulent distortion” is a major factor affecting market efficiency); see also 
Grigori Erenburg et al., The Paradox of “Fraud-on-the-Market Theory”: Who Relies on the 
Efficiency of Market Prices?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 260, 260 (2011) (noting “some cases 
certified for class action status do not satisfy the conditions for even weak-form efficiency”). 
49. See Erenburg et al., supra note 48, at 264–65 (noting the “fundamental issue” in
Rule 10b-5 actions is whether “investors relied on fraudulent information”). 
50. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2408.
51. See id. (arguing that “subsequent developments in economic theory” are not sufficiently
significant as to justify overruling Basic). 
52. Id. at 2411 (“Basic never denied the existence of [value] investors.”); see also Erenburg
et al., supra note 48, at 265 (noting expert traders exploit market inefficiency to “capitalize on 
mispricing”). 
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market efficiency, and why efficiency is critical to tying an alleged 
misstatement to causation and reliance, both of which are elements 
required to prove securities fraud. Part V will discuss the assumption 
that investors rely on price when trading, positing that many 
investors, in fact, do not. Finally, Part VI will discuss the 
implications of the Court’s ruling on class action securities fraud 
litigation. 
IV. MARKET EFFICIENCY
A. The Court Was Inconsistent in Its Cursory Review of
Empirical Evidence Against Market Efficiency
The fraud-on-the-market theory espoused in Basic assumes 
financial markets are “mechanically” efficient, or that prices react 
swiftly to public information, but that is not always the case.53 There 
is not always an immediate cause-and-effect reaction.54 Whereas the 
Basic Court justified creating an evidentiary presumption with 
empirical evidence showing large financial markets were efficient,55 
the Halliburton Court dismissed similar evidence against market 
efficiency.56 Such inconsistent reasoning is bound to occur when the 
Court relies on economic theories rather than legal analysis.57 
The Court not only dismissed the very same type of evidence it 
had used to create the reliance presumption but also improperly 
assumed the markets had not changed in twenty-five years. In Basic, 
the Court argued that the reliance presumption was appropriate for a 
market that “involve[ed] millions of shares changing hands daily.”58 
To justify applying the reliance presumption, the Basic Court 
considered “recent empirical studies” concerning financial markets 
and decided to eliminate one of the traditional elements required to 
53. See William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time
of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 852 (2005). 
54. See Michael Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Curious Incident of the Dog That
Didn’t Bark and Establishing Cause-and-Effect in Class Action Securities Litigation, 6 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 415, 418, 423 (2012). 
55. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246
(1988)). 
56. See id. at 2410 (arguing that whether the market was efficient was “largely beside the
point”). 
57. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (White, J., dissenting) (warning confusion is “inevitable”
when legal analysis is replaced with “economic theorization”). 
58. Id. at 243–44.
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prove fraud.59 However, the Halliburton Court dismissed similar 
modern empirical studies, arguing these studies were insufficient 
justification for overruling Basic and the reliance presumption.60 
Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowledge that modern 
trading takes place on many types of securities markets, thus a “one 
size fits all” evidentiary presumption may not apply to all securities 
fraud plaintiffs. Basic concerned a company whose stock had traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange,61 a market for larger, heavily 
traded issuers.62 In contrast to twenty-five years ago when Basic was 
decided, the overwhelming majority of modern public companies are 
small,63 and their stocks are inherently more volatile than those of 
their larger counterparts.64 Less than 6 percent of companies on the 
Wilshire 5000, an index of U.S. equities, are classified as “large-cap” 
issuers65 with market capitalizations over $10 billion.66 “Even in the 
absence of fraud,” any trading activity can have a disproportionate 
effect on a small- or micro-cap stock’s price.67 
The Court also failed to consider that a large portion of trading 
now occurs on small, less transparent markets.68 Approximately 40 
percent of all domestic trades occur off the major exchanges—the 
59. See id. at 246.
60. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409–10.
61. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.
62. See Minimum Numerical Standards—Domestic Companies—Equity Listings, NYSE,
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_2_2_1& 
manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (listing, among 
other requirements, New York Stock Exchange issuers must have an “aggregate market value of 
publicly-held shares of $40,000,000”). 
63. See Michael Santoli, The Stock Market Is ‘Shrinking,’ Despite Record-High Indexes,
YAHOO FINANCE (Dec. 6, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/michael-santoli/the 
-stock-market-is--shrinking---despite-record-high-indexes-171141756.html (reporting fewer
public companies with more companies falling into the “small-stock” category).
64. Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (“Even in the 
absence of fraud, microcap stocks historically have been more volatile and less liquid than the 
stock of larger companies.”). 
65. The Case for Mid-Cap Stocks in Today’s Volatile Markets, ROXBURY CAPITAL MGMT.,
http://www.roxcap.com/PDF%20Files/White%20Papers/Mid_Cap_Stocks_The_Case_for 
_06032005.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
66. Large Cap—Big Cap, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/large
-cap.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
67. See Microcap Stock, supra note 64, and accompanying text.
68. See John McCrank, Dark Markets May Be More Harmful Than High-Frequency
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2014, 8:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/06/us-dark 
-markets-analysis-idUSBREA3508V20140406 (reporting “around 40 percent of all U.S. stock
trades . . . now happen ‘off exchange,’ up from around 16 percent six years ago”).
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NASDAQ and the NYSE.69 In such markets, broker intermediaries 
“internalize trades” and are not required to provide any information 
to the market prior to executing the trade such that price is not 
adjusted until afterward.70 The efficient and timely incorporation of 
public information into a stock’s market price is precisely what 
enables the inference that a material public misstatement about a 
company or its stock caused an investor’s loss.71 Therefore, the 
presumption that investors relied on the stock’s price would only 
apply in “well-developed” markets that efficiently process 
information and prices adjust accordingly.72 In an efficient market, 
misleading or inaccurate statements will defraud investors even if 
they did not individually rely on that information when buying or 
selling the stock.73 However, in “dark” markets and smaller, 
inefficient markets composed of “under-followed” stocks, 
information is often not incorporated into the stock’s price in an 
efficient or timely manner.74 
If the legal presumption of class-wide reliance rests on an 
efficient market’s existence, courts should analyze market efficiency 
using a widely accepted means such as an event study.75 Although 
the Supreme Court has not provided a test for determining market 
efficiency, federal appeals courts often look to the factors provided 
in Cammer v. Bloom.76 These factors include (1) a large weekly 
trading volume; (2) analyst following; (3) the presence of market 
makers; (4) issuer qualification for use of an S-3 registration 
statement; and (5) facts showing causal relationship between 
information and stock price.77 Courts most often rely on the fifth 
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2404 (2014) (“Basic
allows plaintiffs to establish price impact indirectly by showing that a stock traded in an efficient 
market and that a defendant’s misrepresentations were public and material.”). 
72. Id. at 2408 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988)).
73. See Hartzmark & Seyhun, supra note 54, at 420–21 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1168 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
74. See McCrank, supra note 68, at 1; see also Santoli, supra note 63, at 4 (noting that many
micro- and small-cap stocks are typically not followed by industry analysts). 
75. See Fisher, supra note 53, at 878 (arguing event studies can prove “reliance, materiality,
loss causation, and damages”). 
76. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989); see Fisher, supra note 53, at 858–
59. 
77. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 06-3794-
cv, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52991 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) at *11–13; Hartzmark & Seyhun, 
supra note 54, at 421–22. 
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factor as most determinative of efficiency.78 The Court did not 
conduct a Cammer-style analysis in Halliburton because the issue 
was limited to what evidence could be introduced at the 
class-certification stage.79 However, the reliance presumption’s 
applicability turns on whether the market was efficient for the stock 
in question, so the Court’s failure to address market efficiency before 
allowing the plaintiff to invoke a key evidentiary presumption was 
substantially unfair. 
B. The Abundance of Market-Distorting Factors Render the
Reliance Presumption Improper 
As suggested previously, stock prices do not always efficiently 
reflect all available public information, which calls into question the 
reliance presumption’s validity.80 The Court discounted 
non-fraudulent market distorting factors such as undervaluation,81 
bubble-bursting,82 day trading,83 short selling,84 and third-party stock 
manipulation, all of which are unrelated to fraudulent conduct on the 
issuer’s part.85 The Court in Halliburton dismissed the impact of 
short selling and arbitrage trading on market efficiency.86 But short 
sales account for 31% of all sales for NASDAQ listed stocks and 
24% of all NYSE listed stocks.87 As opposed to investors who make 
trading decisions based on a stock’s perceived value, short sellers 
78. See Hartzmark & Seyhun, supra note 54, at 423.
79. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014).
80. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 48, at 671.
81. Undervalued, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/undervalued.asp
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (defining undervalued as a stock “selling for a price presumed to be 
below the investment’s true intrinsic value” based on typical indicators of financial performance 
including “cash flow, return on assets, [and] profit retention”). 
82. Fisher, supra note 53, at 895 (arguing that cultural and behavioral factors spurred
aggressive trading during the late 1990s, which saw “huge swings” in market index and “bizarre” 
individual company valuations). 
83. Id. at 922 n.202 (defining a “day trader” as an unlicensed individual who trades
frequently based on short-term interests, and whose ability to trade is based on “real time” access 
to exchanges). 
84. Id. at 913, 914 n.181 (referring to selling shares not yet owned by borrowing against
funds held in a margin account, then closing the position and delivering those shares to the 
buyer). 
85. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 48, at 671 (arguing fraudulent distortion, not
efficiency, should be dispositive in determining whether the reliance presumption applies). 
86. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410–11 (2014).
87. See Merrit B. Fox et al., Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary Report on an
Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 646 (2009–2010) (reporting that in 2009, short 
sales accounted for 31 percent of all sales for NASDAQ-listed stocks and 24 percent of all 
NYSE-listed stocks). 
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place an order to sell a stock based on the expectation that the price 
will drop before they close their position or finalize the sale.88 
Short selling arguably yields some benefits to the market such as 
balancing overvaluation or “bubbles” caused by irrational “noise 
trading,” increasing liquidity, and allowing brokerages to make a 
market for securities in the face of heavy selling.89 Short selling also 
offers incentives and opportunities to manipulate stock values.90 One 
method is to offer to buy a stock at a future price below the current 
traded value, resell, spread negative misinformation with the intent to 
drive the price down, then cover the transaction (close the position) 
at the lower price.91 Additionally, short sellers can disseminate false 
positive news that drives up a stock’s price, then short sell at the 
inflated price anticipating that the price will fall when the market 
learns the truth.92 
While Rule 10b-5 prohibits market manipulation,93 the large 
number of online forums for spreading such false information 
enables short sellers’ to conduct these strategies with anonymity. 
Many Internet sites purport to offer a medium for traders to exchange 
information about stocks but allow users to create pseudonyms so 
anyone can post unverified information about a company.94 
The active presence of short sellers and the effect on market 
efficiency raises causation issues for investors seeking to recover in 
Rule 10b-5 class actions. When investors exploit a stock’s 
inefficiency, through their own activities or those of third parties, 
less informed traders cannot rely on market efficiency, and their 
88. Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s
/shortselling.asp. 
89. Fox et al., supra note 87, at 651–52.
90. Id. at 652–53.
91. Id. at 656.
92. Id.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (prohibiting any activity that would “operate as fraud” in
the sale or purchase of any security). 
94. See, e.g., About Seeking Alpha, SEEKING ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/page/about_us
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014) (purporting its articles “move stocks” because they are widely viewed 
by financial professionals and bloggers); see also Tips for Short Selling Penny Stocks, ALTCOIN 
NEWSLETTER (Aug. 18, 2014), http://altcoinnewsletter.com/short-sell-penny-stocks/ (suggesting 
“negative financial news or bearish trader sentiment on social media will move [stock] prices” 
and help traders “profitably short penny stocks”). 
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losses—at least in part—may be due to trading a stock that is heavily 
shorted and would not be fully attributable to the alleged fraud.95 
If these factors frequently result in an inefficient market, then it 
follows that a blanket reliance presumption is improper. Although 
event studies can help explain stock price fluctuations, market 
variables that can impact a stock’s price make it difficult to isolate 
causation with precision.96 
V. THE FAULTY ASSUMPTION THAT MOST INVESTORS
TRADE BASED ON EFFICIENT MARKET PRICE
The reliance presumption assumes investors rely on efficient 
market pricing. The Court in Basic noted the presence of value 
investors, professionals who aim to take advantage of inaccurate 
prices to profit from future price adjustments, but reasoned these 
investors had relied on the fact the stock would “eventually reflect 
material information.”97 The Court’s reasoning does not reconcile 
these strategies with the reliance presumption’s premise that an 
investor relies on price at the time she transacts.98 This flawed 
reasoning failed to convince all members of the Basic Court99 and 
continued to trouble at least three of the Justices in Halliburton.100 If 
a trader buys or sells based on perceived under- or overvaluation, 
then that trader does not rely on an efficient market price “at the time 
he transacts.”101 
In addition to the prevalence of trading strategies unrelated to 
price, modern markets are flooded with information from a variety of 
credible and non-credible sources.102 The amorphous numbers of 
variables that affect trading decisions render the presumption that 
most investors rely on efficient pricing improper. Many investors 
95. See generally Erenburg et al., supra note 48 (supporting the general premise that modern
markets are often inefficient due to price-distorting factors). 
96. See Hartzmark & Seyhun, supra note 54, at 425–26 (noting difficulties with separating
market- and industry-wide variation from firm-specific price movement). 
97. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014).
98. Id. at 2423 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 251 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing an
investor who “sells a stock ‘short’ days before the misrepresentation is made” cannot be said to 
have relied on the price). 
100. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2423 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. See Jane Thayer, Investors Trust Dubious Sources for Stock News, ACCT. TODAY (Jan. 4,
2011), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Investors-Trust-Dubious-Sources-Stock-News 
-56806-1.html.
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now rely on secondary sources of information rather than 
information released directly from the issuer, as recommended by 
regulatory authorities.103 Since Basic’s ruling twenty-one years ago, 
financial markets have been inundated with information from online 
information reporting websites,104 analysts,105 and financial blogs.106 
Whereas analysts and market professionals or arbitrageurs can 
enhance price efficiency,107 less reputable investors who are vocal on 
financial blogs can easily distort the market for a micro-cap stock.108 
Many investors base trading decisions on “momentum strategies” 
rather than market price or available information.109 Amateur 
investors are more likely to trade based on tips from other online 
investors.110 These investors communicate with other investors and 
the market by establishing anonymous profiles on “online bulletin 
boards or electronic chat rooms” where they purport to have credible 
information about a company’s stock value.111 Investors on websites 
may target specific stocks and suggest opportunities to profit from 
“shorting” the stock.112 For example, during periods of heavy selling, 
an investor may anticipate an individual stock’s price may fall as a 
103. See Managing Investment Risk, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/AdvancedInvesting/ManagingInvestmentRisk/ 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (recommending investors evaluate risk by researching issuer-sourced 
information such as SEC reports and financial statements). 
104. See, e.g., Investor Protection, OTC MARKETS, http://www.otcmarkets.com/learn/otc
-company-overview (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (claiming it organizes and disseminates stock
information, company information, thereby increasing investors’ access to information).
105. Analyst, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/analyst.asp (last visited
Feb. 4, 2015) (defining an analyst as a “financial professional who has expertise in evaluating 
investments and puts together . . . [specific trading] recommendations”).  
106. Financial Blog, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialblog.asp
(last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (noting financial blogs often share or comment on information, but also 
provide free “analysis” that often “reflect[s] personal opinion”). 
107. See Fisher, supra note 53, at 854–55 (referring to Basic, in which the Court noted
“shrewd” market professionals who trade based on anticipated future value increase market and 
price efficiency).  
108. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying footnote (noting even minimal trading activity
can distort the price of micro-cap stocks). 
109. See Erenburg et al., supra note 48, at 261.
110. See The Aleph Blog, The Tip Culture in Amateur Investing, YAHOO FINANCE (Aug. 16,
2014, 9:03 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/tumblr/blog-the-tip-culture-in-amateur-investing 
-080824959.html (noting the “tip culture” of inexperienced investors).
111. Fisher, supra note 53, at 925.
112. See, e.g., Kapitall, 16 Microcap Stocks Being Targeted by Short Sellers, SEEKING ALPHA
(Oct. 26, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/302247-16-micro-cap-stocks-being-
targeted-by-short-sellers (“If you’re looking for micro-cap short ideas, [see] the following 
list . . . .”). 
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result of the general market momentum and decide to sell.113 That 
investor does not rely on the stock’s current price when trading. To 
allow traders who traded for reasons unrelated to price to 
nevertheless invoke the reliance presumption is a miscarriage of 
justice.114 
VI. HALLIBURTON DID LITTLE TO REMEDY BASIC’S
“BITTER HARVEST” 
The implications of the Court’s ruling in Halliburton are 
potentially significant, particularly with respect to class action 
litigation strategy. The ruling will not likely result in an 
overwhelming reduction in Rule 10b-5 class actions as many issuers 
and corporate advocates hoped because investors can still invoke the 
reliance presumption. The Court’s adherence to the old reliance 
presumption allows investors to proceed through class certification 
but only if their claims can survive a price impact attack. Many 
corporate litigators, however, expect the ruling to increase the 
amount of resources defendant corporations spend on the 
certification stage because of the potential to defeat certification with 
evidence of an absence of price impact.115 Introducing price impact 
evidence requires additional expert witnesses to testify using 
complex event studies; both the expert witnesses and the studies are 
costs defendants will assume.116 
Upholding the reliance presumption but allowing defendants to 
rebut it with price impact evidence holds the gates open for lucrative 
securities class actions but increases the already heavy burden on 
trial courts.117 Halliburton’s direct implication will be that trial court 
judges will now have the difficult job of distinguishing price impact 
113. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A
Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 22 (1994). 
114. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2422 (2014) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing that “Basic’s critical fiction falls apart” when applied to an investor who 
did not trade based on what he thought was an efficient price). 
115. See Smith et al., supra note 35.
116. See id.
117. See Jared L. Kopel, Viewpoint: In Halliburton Ruling, a Few Tweaks, But No Overhaul
of Securities Class Actions, THE RECORDER (June 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202723759021/Viewpoint-SEC-Eyes-Cybersecurity-Disclosure-
Regs. 
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evidence from evidence on the absence of causation and materiality, 
which is prohibited at class certification.118 
One possible implication of Halliburton on litigants is that 
plaintiffs’ firms may select cases with facts likely to withstand a 
vigorous price impact challenge or involving larger damage 
amounts.119 Furthermore, claims that survive class certification will 
be worth more in settlement.120 Defendants may also be more willing 
to settle if a price impact rebuttal fails. 
Ultimately, investors will carry the burden of the Court’s 
Halliburton ruling. Higher costs for companies will negatively 
impact shareholder returns, since profits will decrease from increased 
litigation and insurance expenses.121 Companies may also undertake 
planning measures that anticipate these extra litigation costs such as 
purchasing larger director and officer insurance plans.122 
The Court should have seized a ripe opportunity to strike down 
an erroneous legal doctrine based on an economic theory 
contradicted by modern empirical evidence. Its failure to do so will 
likely result in continued inconsistency as federal courts strive to 
discern when economic conditions warrant applying the reliance 
presumption.123 As Justice Thomas noted in his Halliburton 
concurrence, a legal doctrine should not be based on a “judicial 
hunch.”124 As a result of the holding, the reliance presumption 
continues to be available to all investors who trade during the 
allegedly affected time frame regardless of whether they ever saw or 
118. See id.
119. See id. (noting at least one prominent plaintiffs’ attorney expected firms to “consolidate
their resources, formally or informally”). 
120. See id.
121. See Andrew J. Pinkus, Why The Supreme Court’s Decision in Halliburton Is Bad News
for Investors and the Public, CLASS DEFENSE BLOG (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2014/06/24/why-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-halliburton-is 
-bad-news-for-investors-and-the-public/ (citing a study that reported “investors’ ‘total wealth
loss’ from securities class actions ‘averages to about $39 billion per year, in order to collect an
average of $6 billion in settlements per year’”).
122. See id.; see, e.g., The Halliburton, Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. Decision: The Event
Study Endorsement, AIG, http://www.aig.com/halliburton-d-and-o_3171_611162.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015) (responding to Halliburton’s ruling by offering to “D&O policyholders the 
Event Study endorsement, a policy endorsement that ensures primary D&O policy funds are 
immediately available to clients named as defendants in securities class actions for the 
preparation of event studies”). 
123. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Confusion and contradiction in court rulings are inevitable . . . .”). 
124. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2422 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). 
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traded on the alleged misinformation. Thus, the flow of meritless 
claims will continue to burden the federal courts and cost investors 
billions.125 
125. See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 755 (3d Cir. 2010) (“An increase in
frivolous litigation drives up the overall costs of issuing securities, ultimately harming everyone 
involved.”). 
